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Abstract
Background Advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs) are beginning to reach European markets, and questions are 
being asked about their value for patients and how healthcare systems should pay for them.
Objectives To identify and discuss potential challenges of ATMPs in view of current health technology assessment (HTA) 
methodology—speciically economic evaluation methods—in Europe as it relates to ATMPs, and to suggest potential solu-
tions to these challenges.
Methods An Expert Panel reviewed current HTA principles and practices in relation to the speciic characteristics of ATMPs.
Results Three key topics were identiied and prioritised for discussion—uncertainty, discounting, and health outcomes 
and value. The panel discussed that evidence challenges linked to increased uncertainty may be mitigated by collection of 
follow-on data, use of value of information analysis, and/or outcomes-based contracts. For discount rates, an international, 
multi-disciplinary forum should be established to consider the economic, social and ethical implications of the choice 
of rate. Finally, consideration of the feasibility of assessing the value of ATMPs beyond health gain may also be key for 
decision-making.
Conclusions ATMPs face a challenge in demonstrating their value within current HTA frameworks. Consideration of current 
HTA principles and practices with regards to the speciic characteristics of ATMPs and continued dialogue will be key to 
ensuring appropriate market access.
Classiication code I.
Keywords Advanced therapy medicinal products · Regenerative medicine · Cell therapy · Gene therapy · Health technology 
assessment · Value
Introduction
The European Medicines Agency’s (EMA) deinition of 
advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs) is: “med-
icines for human use that are based on genes or cells … 
[and] ofer groundbreaking new opportunities for the treat-
ment of disease and injury” [1]. ATMPs are classiied into 
four groups: (1) gene therapy medicines; (2) somatic-cell 
therapy medicines; (3) tissue-engineered medicines; and (4) 
combined ATMPs [1]. In general, ATMPs use “… methods 
to replace or regenerate human cells, tissues or organs to 
restore or establish normal function” [2]. Mason and Dun-
hill comment that regenerative medicines have the potential 
to be “disruptive technologies” [2], and it is widely agreed 
that regenerative medicine is a multidisciplinary ield of 
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medicine with the potential to improve outcomes and cause 
a step change in the delivery of healthcare.
Health technology assessment (HTA) is a “multidisci-
plinary activity that systematically examines the technical 
performance, safety, clinical eicacy and efectiveness, cost, 
cost-efectiveness, organisational implications, social con-
sequences, legal and ethical considerations” [3] of a health 
technology. It is a form of policy research with speciic 
methodology that examines the short- and long-term con-
sequences of the application of a healthcare technology to 
inform policy decision-making and enable rational decisions 
to be made for healthcare resource allocation [4]. Method-
ological guidelines have been developed in an attempt to 
harmonise the HTA process. Drummond et al. proposed a 
set of 15 principles that can be used in assessing existing 
or establishing new HTA activities [5]. These principles 
describe and discuss elements of good practice in developing 
the structure and remit of HTA organizations, the methods 
of and processes for conducting HTA, and the use of HTA 
in decision-making [5]. In addition, the European Network 
of HTA (EuNetHTA) has developed a value framework to 
enable transparent structures, procedures and standards for 
handling evidence and information across various forms of 
HTAs, economic evaluations, and other forms of assess-
ments of the value of interventions across institutions and 
countries [6]. However, there is still much variation between 
HTA agencies [7–9].
It is anticipated that ATMPs will face some challenges 
in demonstrating efectiveness, cost-efectiveness and value 
within the HTA process. Identiied challenges are associated 
with: clinical evidence generation, safety concerns, assess-
ing and paying for value, uncertainty, afordability, and the 
manufacturing and organisation of service delivery [10–13].
ATMPs ofer the potential of a one-time cure. Both com-
parative efectiveness data and cost-efectiveness data vs. 
standard of care (often long-term symptom management) 
will be essential to show beneit with payers increasingly 
averse to adding coverage for innovative technologies within 
limited budgets [13, 14]. Recognising the large number of 
ATMPs under development, HTA agencies have started to 
consider whether current HTA models are appropriate for 
the evaluation of these potentially curative therapies.
In the UK, a House of Lords Science and Technology 
Committee inquiry into regenerative medicine identiied bar-
riers to translation and commercialisation and recommended 
solutions [15]. In response to its indings the National Insti-
tute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) commissioned 
a mock technology appraisal to assess whether changes to 
its methods and processes were needed to evaluate regen-
erative medicines [11]. The NICE report concluded that: 
(1) the existing appraisal methods and decision framework 
were applicable to regenerative medicines; (2) quantiica-
tion of decision uncertainty was key in decision-making; 
(3) where uncertainty is substantial, innovative payment 
mechanisms may play an important role and facilitate timely 
patient access; and (4) choice of discount rate is extremely 
important and can have an impact on the incremental cost-
efectiveness ratio (ICER) [11]. In a commentary on the 
mock appraisal of CAR T-cell therapy, Marsden and Towse 
challenged that while it may be possible to assess ATMPs 
using the existing framework, it does not necessarily follow 
that the framework is the most suitable means of assessment 
[12]. They note that ATMPs are likely to meet problems 
at the extremes, such as when there is substantial decision 
uncertainty, or when substantial clinical beneits (or cures) 
are ofered at very high initial cost and beneits that accrue 
over a long-term period [12].
The objectives of this paper are to identify potential chal-
lenges that ATMPs are likely to face within current HTA 
methodological principles and practices in Europe and to 
discuss options for handling these challenges. The approach 
takes a broad view of HTA methodology, including the 
assessment of cost-efectiveness and individual and social 
value, as well as issues related to implementation and pric-
ing and payment models for ATMPs in diferent healthcare 
systems.
Methods
An Expert Panel was convened comprising members with 
national and international experience in research on HTA 
methodology and application in the UK, France, Germany, 
and Sweden. The Panel reviewed and identied potential 
challenges in the application of principles and practices of 
HTA to ATMPs.
The challenges identiied related to: uncertainty, discount 
rate, societal value vs. expected incremental health beneit, 
budget impact, real-world evidence, wider societal and ethi-
cal impact, and safety. Three speciic areas from this list 
were prioritised for discussion in this paper. Prioritisation 
was based on the existence of methodological uncertainties 
that are likely to be particularly relevant to the evaluation 
of ATMPs.
1. Uncertainty Although uncertainty in the evidence is an 
aspect of all HTA processes, the speciic nature of the 
evidence that is available for newly approved ATMPs is 
considered likely to require special consideration.
2. Discounting The nature of the distribution of costs and 
beneits was felt likely to make the estimation of cost-
efectiveness particularly sensitive to decisions about 
appropriate discount rates.
3. Health outcomes and value The way in which poten-
tially curative treatments may be considered diferently 
to treatments that create smaller incremental beneits 
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for larger populations may raise questions regarding the 
existing methods of assigning value in HTA.
The pros and cons of the alternative options in the assess-
ment of outcome and value of ATMPs to outline potential 
ways forward.
Uncertainty and advanced therapy medicinal 
products
The challenge
Cost-efectiveness analysis combines evidence on the natural 
course of the disease, the clinical efectiveness of alternative 
regimens, preferences regarding health outcomes, and the 
costs associated with interventions [16]. There are a number 
of sources of uncertainty within the available evidence that 
are relevant to estimating the cost-efectiveness of a particu-
lar intervention; for example, uncertainty in the treatment 
efects or cost inputs, the type of model used, and the appli-
cability or generalizability of these results to a particular 
decision-maker [17].
In cost-efectiveness modelling sources of uncertainty 
include: parameter, methodological and structural [18]. 
Parameter uncertainty relates to the fact that the true value 
of a given parameter is not known. Estimates are typically 
based on population means of sampled data; e.g., the cost 
of being in a given health state, the quality of life associ-
ated with the state, the rate of clinical events over time, and 
relative efectiveness. In this regard, uncertainty is relected 
in the standard error, conidence interval, or other repre-
sentation of the probability distribution. Methodological 
uncertainty arises from diferences in the choice of analytic 
methods that underpin an economic evaluation [18]; e.g., the 
perspective of the evaluation; handling of missing data and 
crossover; and, discount rates [19]. Structural uncertainty 
includes the judgments that have to be made when construct-
ing and interpreting a model; e.g., the assumptions required 
in extrapolating costs over time [17].
Within HTA, decisions about the use of a healthcare tech-
nology are often based on the expected incremental efects 
and costs. Assessing the implications of decision uncer-
tainty is an essential part of any decision-making process 
to provide correct evaluation of expected efect and cost; 
to consider whether existing evidence is suicient; and, to 
assess the possible consequences of an uncertain decision 
for the decision-maker. Exploration of uncertainty can be 
carried out using: scenario analysis (e.g., diferent compara-
tors, data sources, and methods), sensitivity analysis (deter-
ministic and probabilistic), cost-efectiveness acceptability 
curves (CEACs; probability of cost-efectiveness), and value 
of information [VOI (or expected value of perfect informa-
tion, EVPI)] analysis [20]. The latter looks at the beneit of 
collecting more evidence to assess whether additional evi-
dence would reduce the uncertainty and guide the planning 
and conduct of future studies [21].
While it is possible to ask for more studies to reduce 
uncertainty, such studies are costly and take time. Require-
ments for more information and evidence before patients can 
get access to new treatment options must thus be evaluated 
according to the incremental costs and beneits of such stud-
ies. When it comes to treatments for serious and fatal dis-
eases, the loss of patient beneits from potentially efective 
treatments due to delayed access must be weighed against 
the potential loss of beneits from the use of resources for 
inefective or harmful treatments [22].
There are a number of obstacles for legislators and regu-
lators to ind the right balance between authorising early 
access and waiting for more trial data and delaying access 
[23]. Peltzman developed the theory of demand and supply, 
and applied it to pharmaceutical drug regulation in the US, 
focusing on the costs of making mistakes of two types: (1) 
admitting unsafe drugs, and (2) delaying the access to efec-
tive drugs [24]. While the US pharmaceutical market at that 
time was mainly private out-of-pocket payment, the theory 
applies in a similar way to today’s market with dominantly 
public and private third-party payment. One diference is 
that costs dominate over side-efects in the deinition of 
the public interest. The majority of ATMPs are developed 
for well-deined groups of patients with severe illnesses, 
and the same patient will experience both the positive and 
negative consequences. The resource allocation decision 
is about comparing and valuing uncertain outcomes from 
new treatment for some patients vs. uncertain outcomes for 
other patients. This is a diicult but unavoidable choice, and 
decisions about pricing and reimbursement determines the 
incentives for (what type of) innovation. When new drugs 
are developed for speciic groups of patients with severe 
disease with limited available treatment options, based on 
understanding of disease mechanisms and what may work, 
the pressure for early access is understandable.
While uncertainty is unavoidable when allocating 
resources for health, as with most other investment deci-
sions in the private and public sector, there are ways to 
manage this uncertainty to provide suitable incentives for 
both buyer and seller. Regulatory decisions about market 
authorization have developed since the 1970s to include 
follow-up studies and re-assessment. For public and private 
third-party payments, there is the additional opportunity to 
make contracts that include actions based on generating or 
analysing information about relevant outcomes. Such new 
contractual arrangements are of particular importance for 
providing rational incentives for development and use of 
ATMP. However, the shift to outcome-based contracts is 
not necessarily a simple step. Insights from contract theory, 
rewarded by the Nobel prize in Economics in 2016 [25], 
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tell us that great care needs to be taken when introducing 
outcome-based contracts. The key to success is careful plan-
ning and collection of relevant and unbiased data.
Traditionally, drug development has assumed that all 
patients with a particular condition respond similarly to a 
given drug. While there often is evidence that not all patients 
respond in the same way, there are often limited possibilities 
for determining response in advance. Personalised medicine, 
however, recognises that complex diseases should no longer 
be considered as a single entity and also provides instru-
ments to diferentiate using, for example, molecular diag-
nostics [26]. One disease may have many diferent forms, or 
‘subtypes’ which will not only vary between patients who 
have the same disease but also within an individual patient 
as they get older and their body changes. For the understand-
ing of value for new drugs with a potential for cure, there 
is also the option to use information on deep response for 
modeling the overall survival (OS) beneit.
Diferent ATMPs are likely to face diferent evidence gen-
eration challenges. For some, clinical efectiveness evidence 
will necessarily come from small, single-arm, or single-cen-
tre early phase clinical trials. Populations with rare, severe or 
advanced disease may be very small, and therefore, adequate 
recruitment to larger scale clinical trials would take a lot of 
time at great expense. In addition, some ATMPs are being 
tested in a wide range of difering indications each with 
small numbers, and, for some, safety and eicacy evidence 
may read across from earlier approvals. For others, identi-
fying an appropriate comparator may be diicult, particu-
larly where no alternative treatments are available, or where 
alternative treatments are not available and treatment is for 
a life-threatening condition, and randomisation to a control 
group may be unethical [12, 27]. Reliance on evidence from 
single-arm trials or other observational evidence may, there-
fore, be required. Non-randomised evidence is generally less 
well received by HTA agencies due to the higher risk of 
bias and higher uncertainty surrounding efect estimate sizes 
[11]. However, marketing authorisations have already been 
granted to ATMPs without evidence from randomised con-
trolled trials (e.g., chimeric antigen receptor T-cell therapy 
[CAR-T]), and for orphan drugs little diference has been 
observed in the approval rate based on the level of evidence 
presented [28].
Trials evaluating ATMPs may also be more dependent 
on surrogate outcomes rather than clinical outcomes [29]. 
Surrogate endpoint data; e.g., progression-free survival, 
are quicker and easier to acquire than inal clinical end-
point data; e.g., overall survival, enabling shorted trials and 
quicker regulatory review. However, there is often consider-
able uncertainty because they may not capture the combined 
beneit–risk proile of a technology and a surrogate may not 
translate to beneits for a clinical endpoint. It is also impor-
tant to validate surrogate endpoints in both licensing and 
coverage or reimbursement decisions by establishing the 
level of evidence, assessing the strength of the association, 
and quantify the relationship between surrogate and inal 
outcomes [30].
The implications of the problems associated with the 
availability of limited evidence will largely depend on both 
the level of unmet need in the studied population and the 
likeliness of cure or improvement without experimental 
treatment [11]. Marketing authorisations may be based on 
limited evidence of clinical efectiveness, requiring decision-
makers to extrapolate beneits over the longer term.
Potential solutions
Several authors have observed the problems for HTA agen-
cies for predicting long-term survival for ATMSs and 
pointed to the need for developing new methods that more 
accurately capture the value of new innovative drugs that 
might include treatment to cure for some fraction of the 
treated patients [31, 32]. For new treatment to cure innova-
tions, the traditionally used parametric methods will under-
estimate survival, primarily when a plateau of long-term 
survival is observed, and therefore, give misleading esti-
mates of life expectancy [33].Othus et al. propose a method 
where survival is measured separate for cured and non-cured 
patients [34]. Applying the method to ipilimumab, reduced 
the cost per QALY estimate to about a third [35].
For ATMPs, the collection of real-world evidence via 
registries—disease or treatment—will be essential for the 
management of uncertainty in outcomes and value. Post-
marketing surveillance is usually a safety requirement 
accompanying regulatory approval [36]. Collection of evi-
dence post-launch will be key to demonstrating evidence 
of effectiveness and comparative effectiveness over the 
longer term. Other complementary evidence that could be 
used includes natural history data, utility data, and the use 
of pooled data. Despite the resistance of HTA agencies to 
accepting non-randomised comparative evidence, there 
are several lexibilities within current HTA framework in 
respect of acceptable levels of evidence. For example, in 
England, the National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence (NICE) framework allows for the consideration of 
non-randomised evidence where it is diicult to conduct 
randomised controlled trials in the assessment of highly 
specialised technologies [37]. In Sweden, the new system 
for managed entry includes a protocol for follow-up for all 
drugs accepted within this access scheme. Such data are 
used for market access agreements and as information for 
renewed decisions [38].
Identiied methodological uncertainties are amenable to 
empirical research. While additional research may suggest 
methodological changes to resolve structural uncertain-
ties that are particularly relevant to ATMPs, a potential 
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disadvantage is that this might require changes to current 
HTA processes and raise concerns about comparability with 
previous appraisals.
Uncertainty could also be addressed in the decisions 
taken. In a recent publication, Hampson et al. recommend 
the consideration of outcome-based agreements and their 
possible combination with potential methods of leased pay-
ments when health beneits are expected over a long time 
horizon [10]. Performance-based risk-sharing arrangements 
(PBRSAs) are sometimes used where there will be signii-
cant budget impact and where there is uncertainty in the 
available evidence base [39–41]. PBRSAs include outcome-
based schemes, risk-sharing agreements, coverage with 
evidence development, access with evidence development, 
conditional licensing and managed entry schemes. However, 
structuring a PBRSA is not straightforward; for example, 
where patients have co-morbidities and measurement of 
beneit may be more complex than a straightforward yes 
or no [40].
Amortisation or leasing schemes whereby upfront pay-
ment systems are replaced with a series of payments spread 
over the expected duration of beneit from a given health 
technology, subject to the health technology delivering the 
anticipated beneit, ofer one approach [42]. Gottlieb and 
Carino argue that leasing mechanisms help to align the 
cost with the long-term beneits allowing the treatment 
to be funded while balancing their budgets and note that 
such arrangements are commonplace with medical equip-
ment where cost is spread over the time horizon that the 
equipment will be used [42]. Although this approach could 
potentially be beneicial there is still a requirement to pay for 
an uncertain beneit [42]. One way around this would be to 
combine annualisation with a risk-sharing agreement [13]. 
The potential drawbacks must be considered alongside the 
beneits of amortization models [13].
Discounting in the evaluation 
of the cost‑efectiveness of ATMPs
Rationale for discounting
In economic evaluation costs and outcomes of two or more 
healthcare technologies are compared over time. It is, there-
fore, important that the impact of diferential timing of costs 
and beneits is accounted for when the decision is made [43]. 
Discounting formalizes the adjustment of future values to 
current value; it accounts for the diferential timing of costs 
and beneits by weighting them according to when they are 
accrued.
In most cases, it is a standard practice to apply the same 
discount rate to costs and beneits (uniform), and to keep the 
discount rate constant over time. Most studies apply discount 
rates provided by central institutions, such as HTA agencies, 
departments of inance or mutually accepted guidelines for 
evaluation studies. However, the approach is widely debated: 
should future cost and beneits should be discounted at the 
same rate, should discount rates be the same in the assess-
ment of acute care or preventive care, should discounting be 
done at all? Uniform discounting is supported by two main 
arguments: consistency thesis (which proposes that incon-
sistencies may occur when discounting at two diferent rates) 
[44], and the postponement paradox, whereby Keeler and 
Cretin argue that if health beneits are discounted at a lower 
rate than costs, the cost-efectiveness ratio can be improved 
by delaying the introduction of the technology in question 
and continue to be improved by further delays [45]. The 
alternative is diferential discounting whereby health ben-
eits are discounted at a typically lower rate than costs, and 
variable discounting whereby the rate is altered over time.
Discount rates in practice
Although the discount rate is a crucial parameter in many 
policy decisions, it is often assigned with little explicit jus-
tiication [14]. Almost all HTA bodies in Europe employ 
discounting in HTA applying an annual discount rate of 
between 3% and 5% for costs and between 1.5 and 5% for 
health beneits [46]. A mix of uniform and diferential dis-
count rates are used: seven HTA agencies specify uniform 
discounting for costs and beneits [47–53], while three HTA 
agencies require higher discount rates for costs than health 
beneits [54–56]. As a general rule, agencies require the dis-
count rate to be varied in sensitivity analyses to examine 
the sensitivity of the results to the discount rate. In Sweden, 
recommendations suggest that sensitivity analysis should 
include use of discount rates of 0% and 5%, as well as a 
calculation where costs are discounted by 3% and health 
efects by 0% [52]. In England, there is some lexibility in 
the NICE process when “… treatment restores people who 
would otherwise die or have a very severely impaired life to 
full or near full health, and when this is sustained over a very 
long period (normally at least 30 years) … a non-reference-
case discount rate for costs and outcomes may be consid-
ered”. A discount rate of 1.5% for costs and beneits may be 
considered by the Appraisal Committee if it is highly likely 
that, on the basis of the evidence presented, the long-term 
health beneits are likely to be achieved” [50].
Whether the discount rate should be the same in all evalu-
ation studies on public projects in a country or whether it 
should be diferent for, say infrastructure projects, health 
services, and medical care programs is an open question. In 
addition, whether the discount rate used in evaluation stud-
ies should correlate with the general level of interest rates 
on inancial markets is another question. The latter implies 
that in times of high interest rates, the cost–beneit ratio of 
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preventive care programs would look worse than in times of 
low interest rates.
ATMPs are likely to involve high intervention costs 
occurring years before all the health efects have emerged. 
Due to the temporal distribution of costs and beneits, the 
choice of discount rate has a potentially signiicant efect on 
estimates of cost-efectiveness. Should speciic discounting 
rules therefore be applied for ATMPs?
To answer this question, one should keep in mind the 
three main arguments for discounting future costs and ben-
eits with a positive discount rate: (1) opportunity cost of 
capital, (2) time preference of individuals or public decision-
makers, and (3) decreasing marginal utility of income [57]. 
The irst, opportunity cost, comes from investment theory. If 
a budget is spent for Project A, it cannot be spent for Project 
B. If Project B leads to a rate of return of, say x %, Project 
A should have at least the same return rate. Interest rates on 
capital markets show these opportunity costs of capital, or 
more generally the beneit of an alternative given up—or 
beneit forgone—when a decision is made. The second, time 
preference, is an individual’s willingness to prefer a certain 
amount of money or a certain utility now than the same 
amount of money or utility in the future [57]. In general, 
society prefers to beneit sooner rather than later, preferring 
to ofset the risk that something will prevent or reduce the 
chance of future consumption. For example, 1 day in perfect 
health today may be considered better than 2 days in the 
distant future [57]. The third, decreasing marginal utility, 
relects positive economic growth, or the decrease in the 
relative value of a good/service over time [57]. If wealth and 
income increases over time, future generations will be richer 
than current ones, so a gain today is better for society than 
the same gain tomorrow. Time preference and opportunity 
cost underlie attempts to deine a “social discount rate”: the 
rate at which future costs and beneits of publicly funded 
programmes should be discounted [57].
It is not necessarily the case that the arguments for 
employing a positive discount rate for decisions at the 
individual patient or investor level justify discounting in 
projects where society as a whole bears the costs and gains 
the beneits. If ATMPs are evaluated from an individual 
point of view, individual time preferences should be used. 
If ATMPs are evaluated from a societal point of view, 
because they are inanced by a public healthcare or health 
insurance scheme, the societal time preference should be 
used instead. Individual time preference can be elicited 
using stated preference methods. They are likely to be situ-
ation speciic, and thus to vary widely. Individuals are also 
mortal and, as such, it is not surprising that individuals 
prefer present to future consumption. Society on the other 
hand is not mortal and thus the societal time preference is 
perhaps more appropriate when considering the sustaina-
ble use of resources for current and future generations. The 
social rate of time preference also relates to preferences 
of society as a whole for present over future consumption. 
Thus, typically the discount rate for healthcare programs 
is based on a social time preference.
This argument has already been developed in a theo-
retical framework by Arrow and Lind in the Arrow-Lind 
Theorem [58]. According to this theorem, the social cost 
of the risk moves to zero under certain assumptions as the 
population tends to ininity, so that projects can be evalu-
ated on the basis of expected net beneit alone [58]. The 
three assumptions of the Arrow–Lind Theorem are: (1) 
the government covers all costs initially.; (2) the return 
of the project must be independent of individual income; 
and, (3) the beneits must be spread out over a reasonably 
large number of individuals [58]. All three assumptions 
hold true in a society where healthcare costs are inanced 
by the government or social health insurers [58].
As discussed in the early economic literature by Bau-
mol and Tullock, the discount rate should be low or zero in 
the evaluation of projects with high externalities [59, 60]. 
This might apply for treatments with high future gains for 
the society and vaccination programs [59, 60], and is why 
one might argue that the discount rate should be zero or 
lower than individual’s time preferences in evaluations of 
long-term public projects or programs.
A lower discount rate for health beneits should be con-
sidered whereby beneits are discounted at a lower rate 
than costs. It is argued that discounting health beneits 
at a lower rate than costs takes into account any potential 
increase in the future value of health efects [61]. Based 
on assumptions about the pure utility discount rate, the 
elasticity of marginal utility, the growth rate of income, 
and the extent to which health afects income, it has been 
estimated that the discount rate on health efects should be 
1–3.5% lower than the discount rate on costs [61]. Claxton 
et al. argue that the choice of discount rate depends on 
a number of factors: on whether the social objective is 
to maximise discounted health outcomes or the present 
consumption value of health; on whether the budget for 
healthcare is ixed; on the expected growth in the cost-
efectiveness threshold; and on the expected growth in the 
consumption value of health [62]. They demonstrate that if 
the budget for healthcare is ixed and decisions are based 
on incremental cost efectiveness ratios (ICERs), discount-
ing costs and health gains at the same rate is correct only 
if the threshold remains constant. Expecting growth in the 
consumption value of health does not itself justify difer-
ential rates but implies a lower rate for both.
A lower discount rate (in comparison to a higher one) 
will support health programmes or technologies with costs 
now and outcomes far in the future, and will also favour 
the beneits of future generations.
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Does “value” need to be considered diferently 
for ATMPs?
Assessing value using the QALY
Priority setting in healthcare has long been recognized as: 
“an intrinsically complex and value-laden process” [63]. 
Society, including relevant stakeholders, such as patients, 
providers, insurers, and citizens, has a wide range of social 
values and interests that result in diferent perceptions of 
what makes health interventions valuable [64]. A recent 
review has also identiied heterogeneity in value assessment 
systems across Europe, which results in signiicant difer-
ences in coverage recommendations across settings based 
on how HTA agencies perceive or interpret evidence and 
the associated uncertainties [65]. Current HTA value assess-
ment frameworks do not adequately capture the range and 
diversity of stakeholder values. Frameworks used by HTA 
agencies are typically based on comparative clinical beneit 
assessment and economic evaluation (cost utility analysis or 
cost-efectiveness analysis) as the main method of determin-
ing the value of new technologies. Sometimes, this involves 
relecting health gain as quality-adjusted life years (QALY), 
or an alternative patient-relevant outcome; for example, life-
years gained [65].
Typically, individuals with ill health want improved 
health; i.e., length of life and/or quality of life (patient expe-
rience in respect of, for example, delivery of care, pain or 
other factors, impact on the family, time of work). QALYs 
combine quality and quantity of life into a single composite 
measure: value per health state multiplied by the length of 
time in that state [66]. QALYs can be used to compare the 
beneits of interventions across therapy areas and determine 
priorities by means of cost per QALY ratios [66] against a 
threshold value of a QALY. In theory, this approach ensures 
that new treatments do not displace more health gain than 
they provide and do not diminish the overall value of ben-
eits gained from the healthcare budget. Thresholds are in 
place in England, Poland and an academic proposal for a 
threshold was identiied for Spain in a recent review [65]. In 
England, the threshold ranges between £20,000 to £30,000 
[50] although evidence indicates that this threshold can 
be modiied in practice with some products with an ICER 
below £20,000 receiving a negative recommendation and 
other products with an ICER above £30,000 receiving a 
positive recommendation [65].
While the threshold provides a framework for decision-
making, it does not take into account the fact that decision-
makers may wish to account for other factors not captured in 
the cost-efectiveness ratio when assessing a medicine pric-
ing/reimbursement decision [67]. One way of managing this 
has been to vary the threshold ICER according to the type 
of medicine, the type of disease, and the decision-making 
context, such as the age of the patient or the severity of 
the disease [37]. However, what constitutes value varies 
between jurisdictions. For example, in England, NICE uses 
an end of life criterion for which the underlying assump-
tion is that society places a higher priority on treating those 
patients near the end of their life [50]: an additional QALY 
under end of life conditions is worth more than a QALY at 
another point time although this is widely debated [68]. The 
threshold is also higher for “ultra-orphan” health technolo-
gies [69].
In Norway, patient beneit, resource use and severity of 
the disease are proposed as the three main sources of value 
for priorities in the healthcare system [70]. Rarity is not 
mentioned as a speciic criteria for value. In Sweden, society 
should be able to pay for more health gain and accept lower 
standards for scientiic evidence when prioritising drugs 
for treating rare conditions if the following conditions are 
met: (1) the treatment has a high cost per health gain as a 
consequence only treating a few patients; (2) it involves a 
health condition with a very high level of severity; (3) that 
the treatment option being considered is assumed, based on 
irm grounds, to have a substantial efect, and (4) that no 
alternative treatment having a substantial efect is available 
[71]. The Norwegian and Swedish proposals have broad 
public and political support, but should only been seen as 
general guidelines. It is up to Legemiddelsverket in Norway 
and TLV in Sweden to translate these guidelines into speciic 
decisions for individual products applying for reimburse-
ment. That includes making the trade-of between diferent 
dimensions of value.
Guidelines for reimbursement are silent about the role of 
empirical studies for assessing the value of speciic products 
or classes of products from patients or the general public. 
Such studies did not ind consistent support for a preference 
for health gains to cancer patients in the context of health 
maximization [72, 73]. However, they observed a higer 
willingness to pay for severe diseases, while the empirical 
support for additional value for “end-of-life” treatments are 
weak [74].
There is also evidence that with short life expectancy, 
few will trade of less survival vs. improved quality of life 
[75]. Cost per life year-gained may, therefore, be a more 
adequate metric for assessing the value of new treatments for 
persons with short life expectancy. Presenting a calculation 
of cost per LYG in addition to cost per QALY, would provide 
decision-makers with additional information for decisions of 
value from a patient perspective.
Additional elements of value (beyond health gain)
While assessments using the cost per QALY approach 
include many important and relevant aspects of value such 
as impact on survival, quality of life, and potential cost 
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savings, they do not include assessment of other elements 
of value beyond the health gain for the patient and costs to 
the health system which may also be relevant for payers, 
patients, and society [76]. Examples of these wider ben-
eits include disease severity, age of onset, lifetime burden 
of illness, socioeconomic impact, and possible spillovers 
from the initial innovation [65], or improvements in the 
quality of or process of care that may also not be captured 
by measures of improvements in outcome (e.g., home vs. 
hospital treatment or oral vs. intravenous treatment). Some 
ATMPs may not be deemed cost-efective according to 
conventional decision rules, and in some cases this will 
be because the therapy simply does not represent good 
value for money. However, in other cases, the therapy may 
ofer high value that is just not relected in the HTA evalu-
ation, and/or the therapy may be restricted by the set of 
aforementioned challenges (e.g., diiculties in establish-
ing robust estimates of clinical efectiveness). Potential 
additional sources of value are explored in the following 
paragraphs, each of which could potentially justify some 
premium on top of what is deemed acceptable to pay for 
pure health gains.
Short life expectancy at diagnosis or at the start of treat-
ment is a common feature of many illnesses. In healthcare, 
a tension sometimes arises between the injunction to do as 
much good as possible with scarce resources (“cost-efec-
tiveness”) and the injunction to rescue identiiable individu-
als at immediate risk, regardless of cost (the “Rule of Res-
cue”) [77]. Culyer notes that the “rule of rescue” argument 
has two important caveats: irst, the strength of the argument 
is weakened if the additional time is of poor quality or of a 
worse quality than would be the case under normal palliative 
care, and, second, that the end-of-life argument applies to all 
patients, and not only cancer patients, in which context it is 
commonly discussed [76].
In an end of life context, patients themselves may also be 
willing to take risks or pay for options with greater uncer-
tainty or immediate mortality risk if there is a signiicant 
chance of increased long-term survival [78]; this has been 
referred to as the “value of hope” [79]. Literature on pros-
pect theory also suggests that patients with life-threatening 
conditions sometimes appear to make risky treatment deci-
sions as their condition declines, contradicting the risk-
averse behaviour predicted by expected utility theory [80]. 
Rasiel et al. demonstrated that behaviour links to a reference 
point; for example, when the recently diagnosed patient has 
not yet adapted to their new prognosis, the prospective value 
of the investigational therapy exceeds that of the conven-
tional therapy [80]. Patients’ reference points may take time 
to adjust following a change in diagnosis, with implications 
for predicting under what circumstances a patient may select 
experimental or conventional therapies or select no treat-
ment [80].
While prospect theory captures individual valuations 
when faced with diicult choices under uncertainty, the 
application of the theory to inform public decisions has 
its challenges. Suppose, for example, a diagnostic was 
developed that can predict which patients will be cured by 
a therapy. This may reduce the value from an individual 
patient perspective, since the hope of cure for all patients is 
replaced by certain cure for a few. A public payer may still 
be interested in paying for this test, thus reducing the cost of 
treatment, but there may be perverse incentives against the 
development of companion diagnostics that may reduce the 
size of the market since this takes away the “value of hope”.
Curative therapies could eliminate the need for long-term 
management and provide longer term increases in quality of 
life. It is not known, however, whether curative therapies are 
valued more highly by society than treatments that ofer the 
same “total” health gains through marginal gains over many 
years and/or patients. Little evidence is available to suggest 
whether or not this preference does exist, and no weighting 
is currently available to adjust for this [10].
Additional elements of value identiied in the literature 
in relation to complementary diagnostics may also be rel-
evant for consideration in the assessment of ATMPs include: 
innovation and real option value, and scientiic spillovers 
[79]. These elements are briely discussed below; however, 
there is currently limited research into how these elements 
should be formally incorporated into the decision-making 
framework.
Producing innovative drugs is increasing in cost. The role 
of cost-efectiveness analysis in incentivizing innovation is 
controversial; currently cost efectiveness analysis rewards 
gains in clinical beneit. Innovation has been deined as the: 
“successful introduction of something new and useful, for 
example, introducing new methods, techniques, or practices 
or new or altered products and services” [81]. It is typically 
characterised in the economic literature as “a cumulative 
process of success” [82]. In healthcare, the term innovation 
lacks speciicity and difers by country [83]. Italy has pub-
lished criteria for identifying an innovative product. With 
this algorithm, pharmaceuticals are designated as an impor-
tant, moderate, or modest therapeutic innovation based on: 
(i) the availability of existing products or (ii) the extent of 
the therapeutic beneit [83]. In France, an improvement of 
medical beneit Amerlioration du Service Medical Rendu 
(ASMR) level (major innovation, important imIf ATMP 
improvement, signiicant improvement, minor improve-
ment and no improvement) is assigned for each product vs. 
standard of care, but the criteria used to determine these 
levels is not deined [84]. Innovations that result in beneits 
for society or facilitate beneits from future technologies 
might justify some reward [81]. Culyer argues that innova-
tion is “already rewarded (or at least encouraged) through 
the patent system and proit with special pricing and proit 
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regulatory scheme in most countries” [76]. To best assess 
the value of innovation, perhaps consideration of the over-
all health need alongside innovation goals and priorities is 
required [81].
Real option value refers to the investment in healthcare 
that can lead to potential treatment pathways for patients in 
the future as other new technologies become available [79]. 
Evidence suggests that patients perceive “option value” from 
treatment as getting one treatment despite its disadvantages 
(e.g., side efects) increases the likelihood of beneiting from 
a better treatment in the future [10, 79].
Finally, scientiic spillovers relate to knowledge spillover 
whereby one company’s achievements can lead to the suc-
cess of another company developing a similar technology 
[79, 85]. Sweeney and Goss suggest that the market authori-
sation of a new therapy leads to additional research and the 
generation of additional evidence to understand the beneits 
of a treatment in a given clinical context [79, 85]. Combina-
tions of approved therapies are used in successive clinical 
trials, further increasing scientiic spillovers over time [79, 
85]. The advantages and disadvantages of the beneits of 
scientiic spillovers are, however, unpredictable.
To summarise, traditional cost-efectiveness analysis con-
ducted as part of HTA focuses on life-years gained, improve-
ments in patient quality of life, and cost savings within 
healthcare. While the current framework may be appropri-
ate for the assessment of ATMPs, it is also important that 
the full potential value of ATMPs is recognised. We sug-
gest that this will involve incorporating an assessment—or 
at least consideration—of other aspects of value into the 
current evaluative framework for reimbursement. However, 
if such additional considerations are to be included in future 
assessment, then further work is required to ensure that these 
considerations are also applied to competing technologies 
and those that may potentially be displaced by new expendi-
ture on ATMPs [86].
Recommendations
Following analysis and discussion of the prioritised HTA 
methodological topics in relation to the speciic character-
istics of ATMPs the following recommendations have been 
made.
1. Consideration of outcome-based contracts, whereby 
collection of follow-up data can mitigate the increased 
uncertainty related to market access decisions for 
ATMPs.
2. The development of registries for ATMPs to collect 
long-term data regarding outcomes, adverse events, 
resource use and costs. Ideally these should be:
(a) Independent of speciic technologies and manu-
facturers.
(b) Inclusive of all technologies, patient populations 
and indications.
(c) International, or based upon an internationally 
agreed set of data deinitions to allow subsequent 
aggregation and meta-analysis.
(d) Funded through approval being given as condi-
tional on data submission, where existing evi-
dence is inconclusive.
3. Consideration of the use of EVPI analysis as an adjunct 
to HTA, to inform better decision-making in regard to 
approvals that are conditional on further evidence col-
lection.
4. Development of consistent methods for conditional 
approval based upon ‘coverage with evidence’ or risk 
sharing, and clear arrangements for the collection and 
submission of supplementary evidence and review.
5. The establishment of an international, multi-discipli-
nary forum to consider the economic, social and ethical 
implications of the choice of diferential or joint dis-
count rates for costs and beneits for HTA, in a variety 
of circumstances. Such consideration may be extended 
to the implications of discount rates in wider contexts, 
such as public health, environmental and infrastructure 
policy decisions.
6. Review existing evidence or, where necessary, commis-
sioning further primary research to establish preferences 
regarding aspects of ‘value’ that may not currently be 
adequately captured in calculations of QALYs. Such 
considerations include:
(a) Valuation of ‘cure’ as opposed to wider incremen-
tal beneits.
(b) Social value beyond health gain.
(c) Patient preferences for treatments beyond health 
gain.
(d) Process utilities and ‘option value’.
(e) The value of spillovers linked to innovation.
Such studies would also need to consider the impact of 
incorporating these additional aspects of value on previous 
HTA decisions and in relation to the opportunity costs of 
displaced activities and disinvestment.
Conclusions
ATMPs may face challenges with current HTA princi-
ples and practices. Consideration of ways of dealing with 
increased uncertainty; for example, by developing out-
come-based payment models, and dialogue regarding the 
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economic, social, and ethical aspects of the implications of 
discounting given the diferential between payment of costs 
and receipt of beneits, will be key. In particular, ATMPs 
may face a challenge in demonstrating value within current 
evaluative frameworks. Broadening the deinition of “value” 
to systematically capture elements of value not captured in 
the QALY, and the importance of considering the value 
of ATMPs and the value forgone in other disease areas, if 
resources are switched when other elements of value are 
taken into consideration will be key to facilitating appropri-
ate market access.
The proposed recommendations are put forward to initi-
ate and continue the dialogue around HTA for ATMPs in 
context of other published reports. By following these rec-
ommendations, the opportunity exists to improve the HTA 
methods used for the assessment of ATMPs which would 
enable healthcare systems to manage some of the uncertain-
ties presented by early data from these products.
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